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Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection et. 
al., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
Matt Newman 
ABSTRACT 
A homeowners association sued the state of Florida to stop a beach restoration project 
that would have created seventy-five feet of new beach separating the private homes from the 
ocean front.  The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the homeowners‟ argument that the project was 
an unlawful taking because it would end the homeowners‟ ability to receive new sand deposits 
from the ocean onto their private beachfront.  The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies equally to court orders and decisions of the judicial 
branch as it does to actions of the legislative and executive branches. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection 
et. al. was delivered by the United States Supreme Court in June of 2010.
165
  With the exception 
of Justice Stevens, who did not participate in the decision of this case, a unanimous court held 
that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection‟s (FDEP) effort to restore an eroded 
beach did not constitute an unconstitutional “taking” of private beachfront property under the 
Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.  Despite the appearance of unanimity however, the 
Court was deeply divided in their reasoning, and the opinion was a complicated mix of pluralities 
and partial concurrences. 
                                                          
165
 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Protec. et. al., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2613 (2010) (Kennedy 
& Breyer, JJ., concurring in part). 
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II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 In 1961, Florida‟s legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act166 (Act) to 
enable local governments to maintain and repair eroded beachfront.
167
  The Act requires local 
governments, wanting to undertake renourishment projects, to apply to the FDEP to obtain 
necessary permits and funding.
168
  If the project requires laying fill material on state-owned 
submerged lands, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board), which 
is the government entity holding title to the lands, must approve the project.
169
  Once a project is 
underway, the Board designates an “erosion control line,” set by reference to the mean high-
water line on the beach, which is determined by averaging the reach of the high-tide over the 
preceding nineteen years.
170
  This erosion control line distinguishes a private owner‟s beachfront 
property from the state‟s trust land.171  Once the erosion control line is set, fill is placed seaward 
of the line, creating new beach on previously submerged state land.
172
 
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 In 2003, Florida‟s city of Destin and Walton County applied to the FDEP for permits to 
restore approximately seven miles of beachfront that had been washed out by hurricanes.
173
  The 
project would add seventy-five feet of new beach seaward of the mean high-water line by 
applying fill to submerged state trust land.
174
  The FDEP issued a public notice that it intended to 
                                                          
166
 Id. at 2599 (citing Fla. Stat. §§ 161.011-161.45 (2007)). 
167
 Id. 
168
 Id. 
169
 Id. 
170
 Id. at 2598, 2599. 
171
 Id. at 2598 (citing Miller v. Bay-To-Gulf, Inc., 141 Fla. 452, 458-460, 193 So. 425, 427-428 (1940)).   
172
 Id. at 2599. 
173
 Id. at 2600. 
174
 Id. 
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grant the permits, and the Board approved the use of the fill and the creation of the erosion 
control line.
175
 
 In response, a group of homeowners, whose property bordered the project area, formed a 
non-profit corporation named Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. (Homeowners) to bring an 
administrative challenge to the proposed project.
176
  After an administrative panel denied the 
Homeowners‟ challenge, the case was taken to the Florida District Court of Appeal for the First 
District, which held that approval of the project had eliminated the rights of two homeowners to 
both receive accretions
177
 on their property and to have contact between their property and the 
water.
178
 
 Because the project infringed on these property rights, the district court held that in 
issuing the permits the FDEP had performed an unlawful taking of the two homeowners‟ future 
accretions.
179
  After setting aside the approval of the permits, the district court certified to the 
Florida Supreme Court the question of whether the Act unconstitutionally deprived upland 
property owners of their littoral property rights without just compensation.
180
  The Florida 
Supreme Court held the Act was not unconstitutional and denied the Homeowners‟ request for a 
rehearing.  The Homeowners then appealed the Florida Supreme Court‟s denial of rehearing to 
the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that the Florida Supreme Court‟s decision was 
                                                          
175
 Id. 
176
 Id. 
177
 Accretions are additions of sand, sediment, or other deposits to water front lands.  Traditionally, for land to 
qualify as an accretion, it must have formed as a result of a gradual drying that is so slow that the result only 
becomes noticeable after many years.  When an accretion is formed it is considered to be part of the littoral property 
of the private property owner.  Id. at 2598 (citing F. Maloney, S. Plager, & F. Baldwin, Water Law and 
Administration: the Florida Experience § 126, pp. 385-386 (1968)). 
178
 Id. at 2600. 
179
 Id. 
180
 Id. 
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itself an unlawful taking and denied the Homeowners‟ property interest in future accretions.181  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
182
 
IV.  UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION 
 A notable trend in recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions is the increasing delivery of 
plurality opinions where the justices join and dissent with one another on a section by section 
basis.
183
  Beach Renourishment is no exception.  Indeed, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of a 
unanimous Court; however, concurrences by Justices Kennedy and Breyer and joined by others 
evidence the Court‟s unanimous judgment was determined by following very different lines of 
reasoning. 
 Beach Renourishment culminated in two separate but related issues. The first issue was 
whether the Florida Supreme Court unlawfully took property without compensation when it held 
that the Homeowners‟ property rights to future accretions did not exist.184  The second, and more 
divisive, was whether a court of law or other member of the judicial branch can “take” property 
under the Fifth Amendment‟s takings clause.185 
A.  The Florida Supreme Court did not unlawfully take property without compensation 
when it held that the Homeowners’ property rights to future accretions did not exist. 
 
                                                          
181
 Id. at 2600-2601. 
182
 In granting certiorari, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, recognized the Court would not ordinarily consider 
an issue that was first presented to a state court in a petition for rehearing unless the state court addressed it.  
However, where the state-court decision itself is claimed to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the state court‟s 
refusal to hear an issue will not bar the Court‟s power to hear the case.  Id. at n. 4. 
183
 Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A Reexamination of the Marks 
Doctrine after Rapanos v. United States, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 97, 98 (2007). 
184
 Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611. 
185
 Id. at 2608. 
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  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began the opinion with the fundamentals of 
Florida‟s property law.  As a general rule, state law governs property rights, including property 
rights in navigable waters and the land that lies beneath them.
186
  Under Florida law, the state 
owns all lands permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore (the land 
between the low-tide line and the mean high-water line) in trust for the public.
187
  The separating 
line between private beachfront, or littoral property, and state-owned trust land is the mean high-
water line.
188
  Because of their unique position, littoral property owners have special property 
rights in relation to the water and the foreshore.
189
  These special rights include the right to 
access the water, the right use water for specific purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of 
the water, and the right to receive accretions and relictions
190
 to the littoral property.
191
  
Traditionally, for land to qualify as an accretion it must have formed as a result of a gradual 
process that is so slow that the result only becomes noticeable after many years.
192
  When the 
change to the land is sudden and immediately apparent, it is classified as an avulsion
193
 and the 
littoral property owner is not entitled to the same property interest as to an accretion.
194
 
 Florida law grants the littoral owner title to any dry land added to his property by 
accretion.
195
  Submerged land that rapidly becomes dry however, is not considered accretion and 
                                                          
186
 Id. at 2597. 
187
 Id. at 2598. 
188
 Id. (citing Miller, 141 Fla. at 458-460, 193 So. at 427-428). 
189
 Id. 
190
 Unlike accretions which are additions of sand, sediment, or other deposits to water front lands, relictions are 
lands that were once covered by water which later become dry when the water receded.  Id. 
191
 Id. 
192
 Id. 
193
 An Avulsion is defined as “the sudden or violent action of the elements causing, for example, a channel of a river 
to abandon its old bed for a new one, or the removal of a substantial quantity of earth from the land of one owner 
and its subsequent deposit on that of another. The difference between avulsion and reliction or accretion is that 
avulsion is perceptible while in progress.”  Id. at 2588 (citing Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Imp. Trust Fund v. Sand 
Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 946 (Fla. 1987)). 
194
 Id. at 2598. 
195
 Id. 
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the title to that land remains in the hands of the state.
196
  Thus, whenever there is an avulsion 
separating littoral property and any future accretion land, a private property owner cannot claim 
the new accretions as part of his or her property because the accretion is added to the state‟s 
avulsion land.
197
 
 The Homeowners claimed their property interest in enjoying future accretions added to 
their beachfront was unlawfully taken when the FDEP approved the beach restoration project.
198
  
However, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out, there can be no taking of property by the 
government unless a party had an interest in that property to begin with.
199
  The Court 
recognized the state of Florida holds the title to all lands submerged underneath the water.
200
  
Furthermore, the Court recognized under Florida law that previously submerged land exposed 
suddenly by the process of avulsion belongs to the original owner and not to the littoral owner 
whose property is adjacent.
201
  Any new accretions then become the property of the avulsion 
owner: the state of Florida.  From this analysis the Court concluded, under the traditional 
common law of property, that the Homeowners did not have a property interest in future 
accretions so long as their land is separated from the sea by avulsion lands.
202
 
 In response to the common law principals, the Homeowners argued the Court should 
create an exception to the avulsion rule when the State is the cause of the avulsion.
203
  Relying 
                                                          
196
 Id. 
197
 Id. at 2599 (emphasis in original). 
198
 Id. at 2611. 
199
 Id. 
200
 Id. 
201
 Id. 
202
 Id. at 2612. 
203
 Id. at 2611. 
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upon Florida case law, the Court rejected this argument.
204
  From the Court‟s analysis, Florida 
law has long recognized that dry land created by filling submerged land is classified as an 
avulsion, and the state retains the title to that property.
205
  Furthermore, the Court declined to 
create an exception to the rule of avulsion under the guise of judicial restraint.
206
  The Takings 
Clause in the Fifth Amendment protects property rights as they were established under law.
207
  
The Court held that it would be improper to declare a taking of property that is not granted to a 
private property owner under Florida property law because Florida does not make a distinction 
between ownership of avulsions created by nature and avulsions created by government 
action.
208
 
B.  A Court of Law can execute a taking under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 
 The second and more divisive issue was whether a court can be the government actor that 
takes property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
209
  The Court recognized that 
unlike the Habeas Corpus
210
 or Ex Post Facto
211
 Clauses in the U.S. Constitution, the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment
212
 is not addressed to the action of a specific branch of 
government.
213
 
 The plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia contended that there was no textual 
support for the proposition that takings executed by the judicial branch were somehow different 
                                                          
204
 Id. (citing Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 574, 112 So. 274, 287 (1927) (holding “when the State drained water 
from a lakebed belonging to the State, causing land that was formerly below the mean high-water line to become dry 
land, that land continued to belong to the State”)). 
205
 Id. at 2612. 
206
 Id. at 2613. 
207
 Id. at 2612. 
208
 Id. at 2612-2613. 
209
 Id. at 2608. 
210
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
211
 Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3). 
212
 Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend. V, § 3). 
213
 Id. 
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from takings affected by any other branch of government.
214
  Additionally, Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, stated that it would be an absurdity to allow the judiciary to do by court order 
what a legislature could not do by statue.
215
  The Takings Clause bars the government from 
taking private property without just compensation, and the particular state actor doing the taking 
is irrelevant for constitutional purposes.
216
 
Although the Court did not develop its own test for determining whether a court has 
performed a taking, the majority was quick to list other constitutional tests believed to be 
inappropriate for determining the presence of a judicial taking.
217
  First, the majority dismissed 
the “fair and substantial basis” test taken from independent state grounds jurisprudence without 
explanation.
218
  It further dismissed an “unpredictability” test that a judicial taking would 
constitute so drastic a change in state law that would be unpredictable for relevant precedents.
219
  
In its dismissal of tests, the majority showed its unease at giving recognition and legitimacy to 
any test which is based on notions of “fairness” or “substantive” concepts.220 
 Both Justice Kennedy‟s and Justice Breyer‟s concurring opinions advocated caution to 
the plurality.  In his concurrence, Justice Breyer admitted that there could possibly be such a 
thing as a judicial taking, but he stated that this question of constitutional law is “better left for 
                                                          
214
 Id. 
215
 Id. (citing Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211-1212, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari)). 
216
 Id. at 2602 (emphasis in original). 
217
 Id. at 2607-2608. 
218
 Id. at 2608 (citing Broad River Power Co. v. S.C. ex rel. Daniel, 28 U.S. 537, 540 (1930) (indicating if a state 
court can show that its decision is based entirely on state law, and the decision does not implicate a federal question, 
than the U.S. Supreme Court does not have power of review.  However, to ensure that state courts do not attempt to 
“evade” Supreme Court review, the Court has developed the “fair and substantial basis” test, which examines 
whether the state court‟s decision is fairly supported on state law principals)). 
219
 Id. at 2610. 
220
 Justice Scalia spent most of his plurality opinion criticizing Justice Kennedy for advocating a test based the 
Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process Clause. For a personal testimonial of Justice Scalia‟s unease with notions of 
“fairness” in judicial tests see:  Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989). 
 Page | 33  
 
another day.”221  Justice Kennedy‟s concurrence took issue with the plurality‟s conclusion that 
there is such a thing as a judicial taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
222
  
Rather, Justice Kennedy stated that if there were such a thing as a judicial taking, it would be 
checked by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
223
  Justice 
Kennedy believed these amendments would have a greater ability to protect private liberty 
interests than the Takings Clause.
224
 
V.  THE COURT’S ANALYSIS 
 Beach Renourishment is an interesting case in both its holding and its warring opinions.  
The Court held there was not a taking of two homeowners‟ property rights to future accretions 
and that Florida‟s property law considered the placement of fill sand an avulsion, allowing 
Florida to retain title of the land.  The Court further concluded that any accretion that develops 
after the placement of fill sand is part of the avulsion owner‟s property and not the littoral 
owner‟s property. 
 However, the refusal of the Court to create an exception to the avulsion rule when the 
state is the cause of the avulsion is troubling for several reasons.  First, the common law concepts 
of accretions, littoral property, and avulsions pertained to naturally occurring phenomena, not 
human-caused events.  Second, the supporting case law cited by the Court held that littoral 
owners did not have a property right to accretions separated from the littoral property by an 
avulsion was not as analogous as the Court made it seem.  The major Florida case cited by the 
                                                          
221
 Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring).    
222
 Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
223
 Id. 
224
 Id. 
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Court
225
 concerned property rights where natural bodies of water were drained dry and the 
littoral property owner did not have a right to the formerly submerged land.  In Beach 
Renourishment, however, the dispute was not over a property right to newly accessible land.  
Rather, the dispute was over the separation of property that would belong to the Homeowners, 
had Florida not created an entirely new piece of property separating the original beachfront from 
the ocean. 
 The issue of whether there is such a thing as a judicial taking is one that currently 
receives little regard, but one that will likely create a landmark decision in the near future.  
Although the Justices debated fiercely over the existence and logistics of judicial takings, they 
reached few concrete conclusions.  They did, however, make very clear that they were laying a 
foundation for a future decision where the issue of judicial takings will be established or 
dismissed as dicta. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Beach Renourishment will not change the current landscape of takings litigation, but it is 
likely to be the foundation for new takings jurisprudence.  Whether the U.S. Constitution (or the 
Court) will permit a judicial taking and what judicial standards shall be applied to a judicial 
taking case has yet to be seen.  Based on Beach Renourishment, it is likely that a landmark 
decision regarding the scope and meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment will be 
coming sooner than later. 
 
  
                                                          
225
 Id. at 2611, 2612 (see Martin, 93 Fla. at 574, 112 So. at 287). 
